The Problem of Falsity in Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory of Knowledge

Mullā Ṣadrā is famous for having endorsed the highly controversial theory of cognitive unity (ittiḥād). According to this theory, an act of knowing consists in an act of mental existence that is shared by the knowing subject and the known object. It can therefore be characterized as an attempt at a metaphysical description of knowledge, an answer to the question of the existence of knowing subjects and known objects insofar as they are knowing and known. Yet despite its alleged success in this metaphysical context, the theory leaves a problematic gap between the metaphysics and the epistemological question of truth and falsity. If the knowing subject is only actualized together with the objects it knows, how can we make a meaningful distinction between true ideas which correspond to mind-independent reality, and false ideas which fail in this regard? Ṣadrā recognizes the problem in his metaphysical discussion of knowledge, but instead of answering it, he simply states that epistemological questions of truth and falsity are secondary to the question of the metaphysics of knowledge. In this paper, I attempt to bridge the gap between his metaphysics and his epistemology. I argue that Ṣadrā inherits his approach from the illuminationist (ishrāqī) discussion of “presential knowledge” (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) and that his way of identifying and dealing with the gap can help us better understand this highly influential but enigmatic concept.