In May 1946, a few hundred Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) workers under the leadership of the Tudeh Party went on strike, sparking a serious energy and labour crisis in Iran. This was the first open instance that the Tudeh directly challenged British interests in the country. The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran had run into complications after the Red Army decided to remain longer, purportedly to protect the newly formed governments in Tabriz and Mahabad. The war in Europe had ended, with Britain emerging exhausted, and economically drained. The Tudeh had been a reliable anti-Fascist front during the occupation but had now become a player to be reckoned with. Coupled with the party’s close alignment with the Soviets, their influence amongst the oil workers was regarded as a considerable threat.
Lasting well in to October, the strikes and long disputes are a fairly well remembered episode in recent Iranian history. And although a conclusion was eventually reached, the intrigues the British and AIOC made have not been told. My paper will shine the spotlight on how the British officials broke the Tudeh in the south mainly through hidden dealings, lies and promises. Privately the British acknowledged Tudeh influence and recommendations but knew that it was absolutely necessary to crush the party’s influence and prominence. The British implemented a multi-pronged approach against the Tudeh. They initially tried to counter Tudeh-inspired demands by getting the AIOC to (un)subtly mimic them. These somewhat tame solutions eventually gave in to more backhanded dealings when they began secretly negotiating and making various promises with local players. Finally when these methods proved ineffective, the British looked to more covert methods such as counter propaganda, counterfeiting Tudeh pamphlets, and more aggressive solutions such as getting Tehran to arrest Tudeh ringleaders, and moving British troops closer to protect the oil.
This episode during the Khuzistan strikes provides a unique insight into the more clandestine methods and closed dealings the British made to counter threats and further interests. I will show this by a close examination and analysis of the Foreign Office and British Embassy correspondence from the period of the strikes. This clear clash with their public persona of wanting to protect Iranian sovereignty and independence reveals a penchant for intrigue and subterfuge. This paper will provide an exclusive behind the scenes look into British actions and policies in Iran.
